Presidential debates are thought to provide an important public good by revealing information on candidates to voters. However, this may not always be the case. We consider an endogenous model of presidential debates in which an incumbent and a contender (who is privately informed about her own quality) publicly announce whether they are willing to participate in a public debate, after taking into account that a voter's choice of candidate depends on her beliefs regarding the candidates' qualities and on the state of nature. We derive conditions under which debates are agreed to and show when they are informative and when noisy. Surprisingly, it is found that in equilibrium a debate occurs or does not occur independently of the contender's quality or the sequence of the candidates' announcements to participate and therefore the announcements are uninformative. * We thank participants at the PET conference in Strasbourg. We especially thank Yishai Maoz for helpful comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are those of the authors.
Introduction
In US presidential elections, debates are major media events. Even the least watched debate had an audience share of about 30 percent (Erikson and Wlezien, 2014) . 1 The debates may or may not have a significant effect on voters (for evidence of the former view see Abramowitz, 1978; Miller and MacKuen, 1979; and Lanoue, 1991;  for evidence of the latter view, see Geer, 1988) . Erikson and Wlezien (2014) point out that although there is some available anecdotal evidence regarding presidential debates, their effect on voter behavior is hard to measure and therefore remains an open question.
Furthermore, while in some countries, such as the US, debates are regularly held before elections, in others, such as Israel, they are rare. 2 In particular, candidates are usually not obligated to participate in a debate and they take place only if both candidates agree. In light of the measurement difficulties mentioned above, it would appear that a theoretical model is required. In what follows, we build a game theoretic model that to our knowledge is the first to evaluate the mutual effect between candidates and voters in presidential debates (although it may also apply in similar contexts). We essentially attempt to answer two important questions: 1) Under what conditions are debates held? and 2) Are they informative or noisy?
1 The debates held in 2000 and 2004 were the least watched among all debates held prior to 2012. 2 In Israel, head-to-head debates between the two leading candidates for prime minister were regularly held only between 1977 and 1996. Even in the US, presidential debates were not held between 1964 and 1972. Specifically, we consider a model in which an incumbent and a contender (who is privately informed about her own quality) are running for president.
Before elections are held, each candidate publicly announces whether he is willing to participate in a debate, in which the winner-from the voters' perspective-is stochastically determined according to the candidates' qualities. On Election Day, the (median) voter's choice for whom to vote depends on the candidate's expected qualities and on nature, which is a random variable realized on Election Day.
We show that the game's equilibrium is independent of the contender's quality. In particular, there exists a unique equilibrium in pure strategies in which the contender always announces that she is willing to participate in a debate, where the incumbent's announcement depends on other fundamentals in the model. This can be viewed as "the dictatorship of the incumbent." Specifically, under reasonable conditions, the incumbent chooses to participate in a debate when her quality is low and to avoid doing so when her quality is high. In a sense, these results correspond to what seems to be commonly observed, where the contender usually challenges the incumbent to confront her in a debate, with the incumbent sometimes accepting the challenge and sometimes not. In particular, in countries in which presidential debates are not regularly held, strong incumbents often choose to avoid such debates.
As a consequence of the candidates' behavior, their announcements are completely uninformative since information on the contender's quality is not revealed. However, if a debate is held, depending on the shape of the probability distribution of the contender's quality, it can be either informative or noisy. Furthermore, the announcements made by the candidates are shown to be independent of the sequence in which they are made, and any sequence satisfies Perfect Bayesian equilibrium when it is endogenously determined.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the remainder of this section, we review the related literature. Section 2 describes the model and section 3 presents the results, which in section 4 are generalized to a game in which the sequence of announcements is endogenously determined. Section 5 concludes.
Literature review
There are numerous empirical studies that support the common assumption that voters update their beliefs about candidates' attributes on the arrival of new information (see, Wantchekon 2003; Gerber et al., 2011; Fujiwara and Wantchekon, 2013; Kendall et al., 2015) . In particular, Banerjee et al. (2010 Banerjee et al. ( , 2011 provide evidence from field experiments carried out in India which
show that voter decisions are influenced by information available on candidate performance and quality. They specifically show that voters sophisticatedly use information to evaluate the candidates. The main assumption in our model is consistent with these findings since we assume that it is commonly known that voters update their beliefs with the arrival of new information. This assumption has also been adopted in the literature on voters learning. However, these (voting) models focus on learning from the outcomes of primary elections and prior decisions made by other voters (for instance see, Dekel and Piccione, 2000; Knight and Schiff, 2010; Deltas et al., 2015; Deltas and Polborn, forthcoming) . We take a more game-theoretic approach and focus on a voter who learns from observing the candidates' behavior in a strategic interaction between them (a debate), which includes the possibility of avoiding it.
In particular, a presidential debate is modeled here as a contest and therefore is related to the contest literature (see Dixit, 1987; Konrad, 2009 ). However, unlike in standard models of contests, we assume that the outcome of a debate depends only on player qualities rather than their effort. Although participating in a debate certainly requires a certain level of effort, we nevertheless believe that in the context of presidential debates, the cost of effort and its effect on the outcome are both of marginal importance. In particular, the outcome in these debates is primarily related to the candidates' inherent abilities. A closely related model is Krähmer (2007) who studied repeated exante symmetric two-player contests, in which the player's choice set of effort is binary. The player's ability, which is also binary, is unknown and she ascertains this information by observing the outcome of previous contests. We consider an effortless single contest with endogenous participation choices and asymmetric ex-ante informed players with private information and a continuous distribution of abilities, which may affect the choice of the winner by a decision maker given her own prior. Therefore, our model can be viewed as complementary to Krähmer (2007) .
The current model is also related to Gul and Pesendorfer (2012) who consider two rival parties that provide costly information to a voter who must choose between their two policies. It is also somewhat similar to Gentzkow and Kamenica (2015, 2016) who study the effect of competition on information in models with ex-ante symmetric information and multiple senders who choose what information to reveal to a decision maker. To study presidential debates, however, we consider a different environment, in which competition is between two asymmetric players with different priors and conflicting interests and who are involved in a strategic interaction with binary choices.
The Model
Two candidates, an incumbent and a contender, are running for president.
The incumbent's quality is commonly known to be (∈ (0, 1]) while the contender's quality, q, is a random variable with a probability distribution p over the interval [0,∞) with mean > 0. The actual value of q, * (∈ [0,∞)), is private information known only to the contender until it is learned by all after Election Day. 3 Since the incumbent has already served as president while the contender has not, we assume that there is more information on the incumbent (which may not necessarily be the case). Furthermore, we restrict qI to be bounded from above in order to assign a positive probability to the case in which the contender's quality is higher than that of the incumbent. 4 Before Election Day, each candidate publicly and simultaneously announces whether she is willing to participate in a debate (P) or not (NP), where the probability of the contender winning the debate is ( * , ) and that of the incumbent is 1 − ( * , )), where satisfies the usual properties 5 :
(1) < 0, * > 0, 2 * 2 < 0, (0, ) = 0 and when * → ∞,
A debate is held only when both candidates announce P.
The voter
There is one voter. In the case that a debate is not held, she observes the candidate's announcements before the elections. In the case that a debate is held, she observes who won the debate.
If we define ̅ to be the expected value of q on Election Day, then the voter chooses the contender when ̅ − > , where (∈ ), which represents nature, is a random variable independent of q with a commonly known cumulative distribution G, which is realized on Election Day (before the voter chooses a candidate). Note that can be viewed as the: "matching-4 In principal, qi can be bounded from above by any real positive number and the specific assumption of a boundary of 1 is made without loss of generality. 5 Note that the constraints on with respect to q* are tighter than the ones made with respect to qI. We therefore do not require anonymity.
from the voters' perspective-of the incumbent to the state of nature". 6 For instance, if a natural disaster takes place in the time between the debate and the elections and the voter has determined the expected quality of the contender to be equal to that of the incumbent, then the voter may vote for the more experienced candidate (this corresponds to the case in which the realization of ε is positive). More generally, a candidate usually has characteristics other than quality that may give her an advantage in certain scenarios. Note that the voter only cares about the contender's expected quality (not about the distribution) and therefore she is risk neutral.
Therefore, after the announcements are made and the debate is held (or not), and before ε is realized, the probability of the contender winning the election is ( ̅ -). 7
Timeline
Considering the above, the timeline of the model is as follows:
1. Candidates simultaneously choose P or NP.
2. A debate is held iff both candidates chose P.
3. ε is realized.
The voter chooses a candidate.
After announcements are made, the voter follows a decision rule and hence is not defined here as a player. We therefore consider a Bayesian game with two players (i.e. incumbent and contender) who have the same choice set: { , }, but different information set. It then seems natural to focus our attention on Bayesian equilibria. 8
Candidates
Each candidate maximizes her expected wining probability in the elections.
We assume that a candidate is indifferent between winning with a certain probability and winning with an expected probability equal to the certain one.
Therefore, both the voter and the candidates are risk neutral. In the remainder of this section, we describe the problem of each candidate and add some notation that will be useful in the rest of the analysis.
The contender Let [ | * ] be the contender's expected probability to win the elections after announcements are made and before the debate is held (or before Election Day if the debate is not held), given q*.
Note that when a debate is held, ̅ is determined after it is held.
Otherwise, ̅ is determined right after announcements are made and therefore then, [ | * ] ≡ ( ̅ − ).
In particular, in the case that only the contender announces NP, let ̅ ≡ | ; in the case that only the incumbent announces NP, let ̅ ≡ | ; and in the case that both announce NP, let ̅ ≡ | ; in the case that both
Let p(q')│w be the probability that the contender's quality is q' in the case that a debate was held and she won, and let p(q')│l be the probability that it is q' in the case that a debate was held and she lost for all ′ ∈ [0,∞). Also, let ̅ ≡ | if the contender won and ̅ ≡ | if she lost. It then follows that:
Given the incumbent's announcement, the contender makes the announcement that maximizes [ | * ]. Formally, given the incumbent's announcement, the contender's maximization problem is:
The incumbent Let be the contender's expected probability to win the election after announcements are made and before the debate is held (or before Election Day when the debate is not held), given that q* is unknown.
In the case that both candidates announce P, let ≡ | . 9 Otherwise, by definition,
Given the contender's announcement, the incumbent makes the announcement that maximizes her expected probability to win the election, i.e., 1 − , which therefore minimizes . Formally, given the contender's announcement, the incumbent's minimization problem is:
(4) min announcement∈{ , } . 9 It is shown later that | is identical to (6).
We now proceed to the analysis of the model.
Results

Mandatory participation in the debate
For the rest of the analysis it will be useful to first consider the case, in which participation in the debate is mandatory (i.e., neither one of the players needs to make a decision).
We add the lower index m to all notations in this subsection. For instance, | is the contender's expected quality given that she wins the debate, and | is her expected quality given that she loses. 10 It follows that:
We now present a technical lemma that will be useful in the rest of the analysis.
Lemma 1
. For detailed calculations, see equations (7)-(10) in the appendix. All proofs appear in the appendix. We now proceed to analyze the equilibrium of the original game.
Equilibrium
Notice that the voter and the incumbent share the same information set and therefore the incumbent's announcement cannot reveal information to the voter. Regarding the contender's announcement, if the incumbent announces P, then the contender's announcement is decisive (i.e., her announcement determined whether or not a debate would be held) and therefore it may reveal information to the voter, since it is made given a specific q* that is privately known to the contender. Otherwise (incumbent announces NP), the announcement made by the contender is not decisive and therefore does not reveal information. We can therefore state that:
Fact 1 Given that the incumbent announces NP, the distribution of q remains p and therefore | = | = .
Furthermore, we can state the following lemma:
Lemma 2 If the incumbent announces P, then so does the contender.
11 See the discussion on the interval [( | ) − , ( | ) − ] following Proposition 1.
The intuition behind Lemma 2 is that, given that the incumbent announces P, an announcement of NP by the contender implies that her quality is lower than it would have been if she had announced P and therefore the contender always responds to P by announcing P.
Note that Fact 1 together with Lemma 2 implies that, in all possible equilibria, after announcements are made, the distribution of q remains p and therefore the candidates' announcements are completely uninformative.
We are now in a position to characterize the game's equilibria.
Proposition 1
The unique Bayesian equilibrium of the presidential debate game is as follows:
(ii)
A debate is not held when | > ( − ). 12
Proposition 1 implies that the equilibrium outcome is independent of the contender's quality (i.e., q*) and at the same time coincides with the incumbent's preferences. The contender always announces P, and the incumbent, who makes the announcement that maximizes her expected winning probability in the elections, is therefore always decisive.
Note that the effect of the incumbent's quality on the equilibrium outcome depends on the probability distribution of ε. In particular, in the case that ε has a unimodal probability distribution, G is convex up to a certain point on the X-axis after which it becomes concave. Therefore, since the interval [( | ) − , ( | ) − ] "moves right" on the X-axis when qi decreases, by Lemma 1ii a decrease in the incumbent's quality can "push" her to participate in the debate. For example, when ε has a normal distribution and goes to zero, this interval sits on the positive side of the X-axis in which G is concave and therefore the incumbent announces P. It follows that an incumbent with high quality prefers to avoid a risky debate, while a lowquality incumbent may take her chances and participate. In the 2015 elections held in Israel, for instance, Prime Minister "Bibi" Netanyahu, who was clearly the favorite and eventually won the elections, refused to participate in a debate against the contenders (although eventually a debate was held between most of the contenders without Netanyahu). In fact, Netanyahu participated in only one debate against one of the other leading candidates, which was prior to the 1996 elections in which he was first elected Prime Minister, and never again agreed to participate in a debate. 13 Table 1 summarizes the expected winning probabilities of the incumbent and the contender, given the information available to them: 15 Note that this definition takes into account only the expected value of the wining probability and is not sensitive to its variance.
Given that q* is unobservable, Lemma 3 implies that, whether a debate is expected to be informative or noisy depends on the shape of the (commonly known) probability distribution of the contender's quality. In particular, a debate is expected to be informative when initially, choosing the contender may look like a gamble, since most likely, she is either a weak candidate or a strong one. Alternatively, a debate is expected to be noisy when it is likely that the contender is a weak candidate (or a strong one).
Endogenous sequence of announcements
In this section, we allow for the sequence of announcements to be endogenously determined. In particular, the candidates first agree on the order of the announcements, and then each candidate makes her announcement in the agreed order. Then:
Proposition 2 In the Presidential debate game in which the sequence of announcements is endogenously determined:
(i) Any sequence of announcements satisfies Perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
(ii) In equilibrium, the candidates' announcements are the same as those in Proposition 1. 16 Proposition 2 implies that the expected probability to win the election of both candidates, the information available on Election Day, as well as whether or 16 Note that there are multiple pairs of announcements that satisfy a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium when a debate is not held. In particular, any pair of announcements except (P,P) satisfies a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium when the contender makes the first announcement, and both pairs of announcements (NP,NP) and (NP,P) satisfies a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium when the incumbent makes the first announcement.
not a debate will be held, are all independent of the sequence of announcements. The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows: The preferences of the incumbent are commonly known, and therefore the contender's action is decisive even when she makes the first announcement, which implies that she cannot avoid a debate without being considered to be a weak candidate.
Conclusions
We consider a model of presidential debates with private information that may apply in other contexts in which two individuals with conflicting interests need to decide whether to participate in some type of competition, taking into account that both the competition itself and their participation choice may reveal information about their abilities to a decision maker. The results shed light on these situations, and in particular on the mutual effects between voters and candidates in presidential debates by showing that the participation choices in the debates are uninformative.
Appendix:
Proof of Lemma 1i: Given that the debate is mandatory, by base rule: Therefore:
. By (7) and (8),
Given that by (1), ( * , ) is concave in q*, ( , ) > ∫ ( ) ∞ =0 ( , )(> 0).
Therefore, since ( * , ) is monotonically increasing in q*, and by (1) , for each q smaller than ̂, the decrease in ( )| with respect to ( ) must be fully compensated for by an increase in ( )| with respect to ( ) for at least one value of q greater than ̂. A similar argument applies to ( )| . Therefore, ∫ ( ( )| )
By (1), (5) and (12) Proof of Lemma 1ii: Substituting (9) and (10) into (6) results in,
where by definition, To see this, assume that the incumbent announces P. If the contender announces NP, then | and therefore also (( | ) − ) is uniquely determined regardless of q*; while if the contender announces P, then | and | are both uniquely determined and therefore given (1) and (2), [ | * ]| is increasing in q*.
[0,1]). Therefore, if there exists a threshold level ′ ∈ [0,∞) that solves
However, it can be shown by contradiction that q' does not exist:
Assume for now that there exists ′ ∈ [0,∞). Since it is commonly known that,
given the incumbent's announcement of P, the contender announces P iff * ∈ [ ′ ,∞), 19 both | and | must be greater than ′ and | must be smaller than q', and therefore If both candidates announce P, then it is commonly known that there exists ≥ 0 for which [ | * ]| > (( | ) − ), and given that [ | * ]| is monotonically increasing in * while (( | ) − ) is independent in q*, it is commonly known that [ | * ]| > (( | ) − ) for all * ≥ . In the following we show that, | > > ̅| for any ≥ 0, and therefore, given that G is monotonically increasing in ̅ , (( | ) − ) > ( − ) ≥ (( | ) − ) and given that by (1) and (2) Note that if = 0, then | = | , where by (12), | > . In case both candidates announce P and > 0, before a debate is held, the probability that the contender's quality is q' is
for all ′ ∈ [ , ∞) and zero for all
for all ′ ∈ [ , ∞) and ( ′)| = 0 for all ′ ∈ [0, ). Therefore, since by definition,
, which by (8) implies that ( )| ≥ ( )| for all ∈ [ , ∞). Therefore, if ∈ (0, ∞), then ̅| > ̅| (> ).
Furthermore, since [ | * ]| is monotonically increasing in * , if only the contender announces NP, then q is in [0,̃], where ̃< ∞. In particular, the probability that the contender's quality is q' is then
for all ′ ∈ [0,̃] and zero for all ′ ∈ (̃, ∞). Since by definition,
= ( ′ ) for all ′ ∈ [0,̃), which implies that ̅| < ̅.
QED
Proof of Proposition 1: By Lemma 2, given that the incumbent announces P, the contender announces P for all q*. Therefore, when the contender announces P, regardless of the incumbent's announcement, the probability distribution of q remains p, which implies that | = | . It follows that, when the contender announces P, the incumbent's best response is to announce P when | < ( − ) , and NP when | > ( − ), in which case by Fact 1 the contender is indifferent between P and NP. However, in the end of the proof of Lemma 2 it is shown that | < and therefore the incumbent's best reply to the contender's announcement of NP is to announce P. QED Proof of Lemma 3i: By (1) and (2), [ |0]| = (( | ) − ) and by (8), | > 0. Therefore, by Lemma 1i and given that G is monotonically increasing in
When * → ∞, by (1) and (2 Now assume for a moment that the contender waits until the incumbent makes her announcement and only then responds with her own.
Since the incumbent's announcement remains uninformative, by definition, the contender's response to the incumbent's announcement remains the same, which implies that, EG remains the same for any pair of announcements made, and a debate will be held iff the incumbent announces P. Therefore, the contenders announcements remains the same as in Proposition 1. 20 Thus, both candidates are indifferent between a simultaneous game and a sequential game in which the incumbent is the leader.
Alternatively, assume for a moment that the incumbent waits until the contender makes her announcement and only then responds with her own.
Then, given that the contender announces P, the incumbent announces P when | < ( | − ), which by Fact 1 implies that | < ( − ).
Therefore, in this case, it is commonly known that a debate is held iff the contender announces P and therefore by Lemma 2, in this case, she announces P for all q*, which implies that a debate is held when | < ( − ) and 20 Note by fact 1, the contender's response to NP can be either NP or P. Therefore, both pairs of announcements (NP,NP) and (NP,P) satisfies a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium when the incumbent makes the first announcement and | > ( − ).
that | = | . Therefore, it is commonly known that the incumbent prefers that a debate will not be held when | > ( − ), and therefore, in view of Fact 1, in this case, any announcement made by the contender is followed by an announcement of NP by the incumbent, which implies that any pair of announcements except {P,P} satisfies the equilibrium of this subgame when | > ( − ). Therefore, in the case that the contender's announcement is followed by the incumbent's, Proposition 1 satisfies Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. QED
